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In his preface to the German dictionary Deutsches Wörterbuch, Jacob Grimm calls
the German legal language of his time “unhealthy and feeble, much overloaded with
Roman terminology” (Dt. WBVorrede, XXXI). In contrast, he praises the graphic
clarity of early German legal writing, which had already been the subject of his
wonderful treatise “About Poetry in Law” (1816). It says (in the consistently lower
case writing which he favoured): “german laws contain a large number of the most
wonderful [legal expressions], which always capture and convey the core meaning
of something with a pure image” (Kl. Schr. vol. 6, 163). Grimm was delighted in this
ancient imagery and the firm roots of the law in everyday language: not only did
they offer poetic enjoyment; they also contributed to a wider understanding of legal
ideas. However, in Grimm’s time this enchanting union had long been considered
hopelessly lost. The legal language had been thoroughly colonised by Latin.
Decades had to pass and many disputes were wrought among academics before
Germany was able to achieve a Germanification of the legal language at the turn of
the twentieth century. From then on, German words and newly created expressions
replaced the Latin terms; the dry and philologically all to distant technical language
became once again richer.
I first came across Jacob Grimm in 1997 when I was working in Berlin on a
dissertation about Napoleon’s art theft. When I found him, he was employed
in Paris as restitution commissioner for Prussia and Hesse. I was twenty-five
years old while Grimm had been thirty. As a scholar he wrestled with the French
bureaucracy in order to identify rare books, manuscripts and paintings with German
provenance in the wake of Napoleon’s fall. These had been shipped to Paris from
all over Europe after the Revolution and during the Empire and were now to be
restituted to their rightful owners. Grimm knew Paris and its institutions well; he
had lived in the city a few years before, sharing an apartment with Carl Friedrich
von Savigny and the latter’s wife. At the time he had conducted intense research
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for Savigny in the Bibliothèque Nationale, some of it on Savigny’s great theme,
the “Right of Possession”. Ever since, I have never lost sight of Jacob Grimm,
Savigny, the appropriation and restitution issues of the period around 1800,
and the related questions of cultural heritage and ownership in a transnational
context. At the moment, they are on my mind more than ever as I also move
between two languages and two states, between theory and practice, between the
law and history, as I am concerned with investigating the question of a possible
restitution of cultural assets from France to Africa. Instead of the issues arising
from legal succession, good faith acquisitions, acquisitive prescription, or the
statute of limitations, all of which form part of the legal debate, my focus is on the
conceptual potential inherent in two German legal terms: “Eigentum” (property)
and “Besitz” (possession). In the following, I would like to dedicate a few emerging
thoughts to them and play with the German (legal) terminology, as a guest both in
the German language and in the world of law.
A brief glance at any legal handbook will suffice to convince the layman that the
two German terms “property” and “possession” naturally also exist in any other
European legal language. All of them refer to Roman law, and the distinction
between possession (possessio) and property (proprietas) entered almost any
European codification. In French there are possession und propriété, in Italian
possessione and proprietà etc. Nevertheless, it seems to me that no language has
made the difference quite so beautifully graphic and serviceable for the issues that
concern us as the German one.
But let us first step back for a moment, while allowing for a tiny irritation. In the
daily to and fro between languages we quickly realise that there are difficulties
in distinguishing between property and possession across borders, never mind
the common Roman root. In everyday parlance, a German big landowner is a
Großgrundbesitzer (from the Latin possessio), while his French equivalent is a
grand propriétaire (from the Latin proprietas). An Englishman’s cultural property
is a German’s Kulturbesitz; conversely, the French propriété intellectuelle (or the
British intellectual property) is in German geistiges Eigentum. Crossing borders, it
seems, confuses legal categories and even turns them into exact opposites. This
is bewildering. But the bewilderment may mark the beginning of new discoveries.
Firstly: the distinction is obviously an oscillation rather than a sharp division, and
it invites discussion. Secondly, one cannot help feeling that in those areas of a
language where legal categories of “property” and “possession” were derived
from the Latin, the distinction has not seeped into collective consciousness and
consequently into the respective everyday languages. Therefore, in English,
French etc. the Latin proprietas dominates as the term both for possession and
for property. And one does get the impression that the respective German terms
are so vivid that differentiation seems easier. But..! At this point you will argue that
even in the German-speaking world nobody is aware of or can tell the difference
between property and possession. Nevertheless, I would like to stay with my
impression for a moment and concur with Grimm’s enthusiastic statement that
in these “most beautiful legal terms […] the meaning of the fact is captured and
expressed inherently with a pure image”. There is no fuzziness; the words say
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what they mean. Unlike in other languages, they suggest that “having” can come in
different forms and imprints.
To quote Grimm’s dictionary, “Besitz ‘m. possessio, formed as in sit [and other
combinations based on the verb ‘sit’]’“ is derived from the common Germanic
“sitzen”, that is, resting on one’s buttocks with an upright upper body. You can sit
on (be-sit-zen) an animal by holding its body between the thighs, you can also “be-
sit-zen” an object like a chicken sitting on its eggs, or, figuratively, a country, a
realm, goods, a house or an inheritance. The physical image of sitting on something
determines the understanding of the fact. A normative system and inner images,
abstraction and imagination go hand in hand.
Eigentum is a similar case, even though not quite so physical. If we follow the
dictionary of Middle High German (BMZ), the adjective “eigen” means “what I have,
what is owned by me and not by others”. It is equivalent to the Latin proprius and
the English own, and comes up in numerous combinations in modern everyday
German. The suffix -tum gives a neutral and abstract quality to the term. Eigentum,
the composite suggests, is that which corresponds to the owner, which is tied to him
in the closest possible sense, as a form of his Self. The very word is an agenda.
But let’s come to the object. According to modern legal handbooks, Besitz as in
possession refers to having “actual power over something” (BGB § 854 Abs. 1). The
owner (Besitzer) reigns over it, he downright sits on it and disposes of it, regardless
of whether he is the legal proprietor or not. Conversely, the proprietor has the legal
power over an object and can “do as he pleases with it and exclude others from any
influence” (BGB § 903). Yet it does not necessarily need to be in his possession. His
ownership of that which is his own remains intact even if the object is taken away
from him. “The thief who steals your bicycle has it in his possession (as Be-sit-zer),
while you remain the proprietor” is a memorable phrase adopted in German legal
training.
Applied to debates on restitution or cultural heritage, the distinction seems to me
to hold significant potential. In accordance with it, museums could be considered
Besitzer of objects which are in their power and of which they dispose without
necessarily having legal proprietorship. Proprietors, in contrast, remain those
who “own” the objects – in the literal sense of the word (what is most closely tied
to them) – even if they may have lost the objects. My property in your museum!
Whether an irony of history or a measure of philological correctness by post-war
lawyers and politicians led to the name “Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation”, in
German “Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz” coined in 1957, we may never know. In
any case, the name is an agenda. It expresses a fact which the organisation itself
would rather disguise or even deny: that in many cases (like most other European
museums) it is sitting on others’ treasures. The organisation has them in its power
and manages them to the best of its knowledge and belief. However, others have an
understandable claim to these treasures. Museums, it could be summarily argued,
are arenas for the oscillation between property and possession. They have even
become (among other things) architectural and institutional temples of these legal
classifications.
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For quite some time, these temples tried to sidestep the property question with
regard to their collections with the catchphrase of shared heritage. National cultural
“Be-sitz” and the cultural heritage of humanity were implicitly considered equivalent,
and the general accessibility of European museums was praised as a form of
universal sharing. Such places, we read and heard, would allow even “migrants to
discover their own culture in the context of other cultures”. The possibility that not
only migrants (!) but entire societies in the source regions of the exhibits may have
an interest in or a claim to them was either disregarded or fobbed off with references
to partnerships and exhibition tours. Yet in times of closed borders and in the course
of the European debate about addressing colonial injustice, shared heritage soon
turned out to be a discoursive cul-de-sac.
The property question was back as the elephant in the room. In Berlin, even in
2015 political activists had brought the issue to public attention with a sophisticated
poster campaign: against a black background and in the tradition of the most
refined museum aesthetic, one of these poster displayed the monumental beaded
throne of Sultan Njoya from Foumban (today Cameroon), a highlight in the State
Museums of Berlin. It was set next to a question in large white letters: “Preußischer
Kulturbesitz?“. At the time, the museums regarded the campaign as a cheap
provocation by postcolonial hippie types. In the last year or so, culture functionaries
and museum officials have tried to find answers after all, by trying to argue in terms
of legality or illegality of acquisitions. All over Germany, the current concern is to
prove the legality of possessions piece by piece, collar for collar, relief for relief
and picture for picture. “We will return stolen objects”, was a recent statement in
Berlin museum circles. Yet everybody knows that the identification of “loot” is time-
consuming and costly, can be ethically questionable (because for example colonial
events are today still assessed in accordance with contemporary European law),
and that the results are likely to be disappointing both legally and politically. In the
recently published guidebook of the German Museum Association on how to handle
objects in the collections from a colonial context, the instructions are unequivocal:
“The current legal situation does not offer suitable instruments to answer questions
arising from property claims in connection with acquisitions from a colonial context –
this applies to both German law and international law.” Second cul-de-sac.
At a conference held at the Collège de France in Paris last June about “Objects’
right to self-determination?”, the ethnologist Benoît de L’Estoile made a convincing
case for liberating the current restitution debate from its narrow, binary Roman-
European legal corset (droit des personnes et droit des biens) and confront it with
extra-European concepts of legality and possession. It was time, he said, to explore
alternative ideas of possession and property in order to design forward-looking,
innovative legal models for cultural ownership in the twenty-first century. Such
an exploration is surely needed, if not long overdue. In my view, it can also be
conducted within our legal traditions, seeking to identify lost options or productive
constellations in the sense of a prospective historiography.
With this in mind, it seems to me that Savigny’s discussion from around 1800
about the relationship between property and possession in Roman law becomes
very topical indeed. Firstly, because its subject is the law of an antique colonial
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power which still influences us today and which had a vital interest in establishing
and securing the legitimacy of different forms of appropriation and management
– for example in order to create a legal basis for territorial appropriation of no
man’s land, which was (according to Roman law) not subject to any property
regime. Secondly, because around 1800 museums, restitutions, art looting, cultural
property and the question of legal ownership were ubiquitous issues in Europe.
At the time, translocations of cultural assets were referred to as “crimes against
humanity” (Heydenreich, 1798); Schiller asked in a sonnet whether the victor or
the art lover was really possessed (im Besitz) of the muses (1803); objects from
Germany that were due to be restituted were referenced as “inalienable property
of the people” (1815). At the centre of the debate were not only property and
possession as firm categories, but also appropriation and seizure as dynamic
processes, as well as the question of a possible or impossible transition from one to
the other – a very central element of the current debate. In other words: at stake was
whether possession (what we sit on) can ever become property (which we own), and
if so, how.
A caustic brief essay from 1840 may serve to demonstrate how the discussion once
proceeded, and how floating or in need of explanation some terms still were, which
could possibly prove to be a productive model for today’s debate on restitution
and provenance. Entitled Was ist und gilt im römischen Rechte der Besitz? Eine
Abhandlung gerichtet gegen die v. Savigny’sche Doktrin über das Recht des
Besitzes, a forgotten lawyer, Karl Pfeifer, criticised Savigny’s interpretation of Roman
property law (p. 65):
Savigny says: „In order to be considered a possessor [Besitzer], one needs to exert
property rights to the object with the intention of using it as one’s own property,
not that of others.” The reader should consider this phrase for a moment […] Is it
really possible to use something as another’s property?! Certainly, one can take
possession of another’s object, as a thief would do, for example; indeed anybody
who treats something as his own while not being the proprietor. But I fail to imagine
what exercising others’ resp. one’s own property rights in something may constitute.
The will to exercise rights over others’ property may conceivably apply to the will to
exercise property rights to something known to be another’s property, for example
the will to steal, rob or defraud. But Savigny does not see it that way, because the
thief is actually supposed to have the will to possess!”
In the poetic haze of this dated and knotty German legalese, we find that in between
property and possession, the ancient discussion – and Savigny’s teaching –
also included the element of the will. This was the will to appropriate, to transfer
the foreign and make it one’s own. Paul Valéry referred to the phenomenon as
incorporation or absorption around 1920, and for him it was closely connected to
“Europe as a concept”: “For us, the ideas of culture, of intelligence, of a masterpiece
have been connected – for so long that we only rarely think back to it – to the
concept of Europe. Other parts of the world had admirable cultures. […] But no part
of the world had this unique physical quality: the most intense radiance combined
with the strongest power of absorption.”. This power of absorption, the will to own
foreign cultural property and to transfer the foreign property into one’s own, to adopt
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Savigny’s categories, describe precisely what our museums are and why they create
difficulties for us today. Against this background, it is worth being aware of past legal
debates and concepts. The German language may help with this.
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